an island, is separated from the mainland of South China by the 100-mile-wide
Taiwan Strait in the Pacific Ocean and is the seat of the Republic of China
government (ROC). The capital of Taiwan is Taipei and other major cities include
Kaohsiung, Tainan, Taichong, and Chilung. The languages spoken are the Mandarin,
Fujianese (Amoy), and Hakka dialects. Religions on the island include
Confucianism, Taoism, Buddhism, and Christianity. THE ECONOMY OF TAIWAN The
1990s have been a time of change and achievement for Taiwan. Politically, Taiwan
has undergone a dramatic transition from an authoritarian government to a true
democracy and on the economic front, Taiwan has continued to prosper. For the
past 20 years, Taiwan has had one of the fastest growing and most dynamic
economies in the world. With over $80 billion US in foreign capital reserves, an
average growth rate of 7.8 percent between 1986 and 1996, and a per capita gross
domestic product (GDP) of $15,000, Taiwan has become a powerhouse in the global
economy.1 Its remarkable success comes after five decades of hard work and sound
economic management that have transformed Taiwan from an underdeveloped
agricultural island to a leading producer of high-technology goods. Helping to
spur this extraordinary growth during the last two decades were supportive U.S.
policies that began with the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA). It maintained
Taiwan’s preferential trade status when formal diplomatic relations were
severed in favor of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). In 1979, Taiwan’s
economy was rapidly expanding and was beginning to fully integrate into the new
global economy. It exported $5.6 billion to the United States and had $7 billion
in foreign exchange reserves.2 Taiwan produced a variety of products,
specializing in textiles, consumer goods, and petrochemicals. U.S. corporations
were beginning to invest heavily in Taiwan when the U.S. government severed the
official diplomatic relations it had maintained with the Republic of China for
three decades. This abrupt loss of recognition created consternation among
foreign investors and Taiwan’s trading partners. International contracts,
which had once been secure through treaties and formal diplomatic ties, suddenly
came into question. The Taiwan Relations Act, however, calmed the fears of
investors by creating a framework that allowed trade and finance to continue
unhindered. The TRA sent the clear message that the U.S. intended to maintain a
close relationship with Taiwan and encouraged business ties with the island.
Specifically, the act mandated that all treaties and agreements remain in
effect, ensuring that contracts could still be enforced. In addition, it
authorized funding for Taiwan from the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC),
which provides insurance, loans and guarantees to businesses investing abroad.
Thanks in large measure to OPIC’s continued programs, trade and investment
tripled over the next decade between the U.S. and the ROC, helping to maintain
Taiwan’s economic boom. In the 1980s, Taiwan’s economy shifted dramatically
toward sophisticated, capital and technology-intensive products for export and
toward developing the service sector. A generation ago, farming accounted for 30
percent of GDP and basic manufacturing represented half of the economy. Today,
farming comprises only 3.3 percent of GDP while services are almost two-thirds
of GDP.3 Taiwan now boasts one of the fastest growing high-tech sectors in the
world and has been called “Silicon East” by Forbes Magazine. Today, Taiwan
is the fourth-largest maker of computer chips, producing 69 percent of the
world’s scanners and over half of the world’s computer monitors.4 Through
the 1990s, Taiwan’s economic growth rate ranked ninth in the world according
to the World Bank, and for the last decade, Taiwan posted an average growth rate
of 6.2 percent each year compared with the average growth rate worldwide of just
2.4 percent.5 During that period, the U.S. achieved growth of 3.1 percent per
year, while Japan grew by only 1.2 percent, as it experienced its worst
recession since World War II.6 Inflation, too, has largely been tamed; World
Bank statistics show that Taiwan’s average annual inflation rate in the first
nine years of the last decade stood at just 3.2 percent, and this figure has
declined since.7 Throughout the Asian Economic Crisis, which began in late 1997,
Taiwan’s economy showed great resilience. Nothing, it seemed, could derail
Taiwan’s powerful economy. When the Asian economic crisis was at its worst,
Taiwan posted annual GDP growth of 4.83 percent, while most of its Asian
neighbors plunged into recession.8 Western press reports painted a glowing
picture of the island’s economic strength. The Economist noted that “one of
Asia’s so-called Tigers . . . has fared better than the rest. While Korea and
Southeast Asia are struggling, Taiwan has so far escaped with a small currency
devaluation and a relatively modest decline in share prices. Economic growth
remains strong.”9 In searching for an explanation for Taiwan’s success, the
magazine noted a couple of factors, including a light foreign burden and better
banking regulation. “A third probable cause of Taiwan’s success is more
controversial: by having a more flexible economy than some other Asian
countries, Taiwan may have been better positioned to withstand the storms,”10
the article said. In addition, the article emphasized that Taiwan makes it easy
for entrepreneurs to start new businesses while also making it easy for old
businesses to die. "This creative destruction spurs incumbents to stay trim
and helps spread new skills quickly,"11 the magazine said, boosting
productivity in all sectors of the economy. "Its history of allowing
troubled businesses to die and new ones to spring up should make it easier for
Taiwan to adjust to turbulent times."12 Similarly, an article in Forbes,
writer Andrew Tanzer says that Taiwan's system has helped it survive the crisis.
"Knowing it stood almost alone," he writes, "it developed habits
of self-reliance, financing growth with domestic savings and welcoming foreign
capital on friendly terms. It has been careful not to run deficits in its
international accounts because it knows it cannot count on help from
international bodies."13 Tanzer also points out that "the island's
relatively small, private entrepreneurial firms are nimble when it comes to
changing with the market."14 He acknowledges that Taiwan is likely to feel
increasing pressure from its neighbors, but concludes that "with its
current account surplus and strong financial condition, Taiwan can afford to
stimulate its domestic economy to take up any slack in exports."15 Finally,
Tanzer gives credit to Taiwan's open and democratic system, declaring that
"the verdict is in: Free, entrepreneurial capitalism beats the
half-capitalist, half-socialist model by a country mile."16 Taiwan has
subsequently transformed itself from a recipient of U.S. aid in the 1950s and
early 1960s to an aid donor and major foreign investor. The ROC's development is
now a model for other emerging markets around the world and Taiwan will
undoubtedly remain one of the fastest growing economies in the world. TAIWAN’S
INTERNATIONAL TRADE With a 258 billion dollar economy, Taiwan is the world’s
13th largest economy and its 12th largest trading power.17 In 1998, Taiwan’s
international trade totaled more than 216 billion dollars and import from all
sources were worth approximately 105 billion dollars.18 Taiwan has a
multi-billion dollar annual trading relationship with the United States, Japan,
Germany, Korea, France, and a number of other countries. Taiwan has tried to
establish its own “international space” in a complex relationship with
Mainland China. The decades long dispute over the status of Taiwan in relation
to the PRC has impaired international recognition and participation in
international organizations for Taiwan. Without taking provocative steps,
however, Taiwan has tried to establish an increased presence in international
organizations, such as the Asia Pacific Economic Council (APEC) and the World
Health Organization (WHO). Through most of this decade, one of Taiwan’s most
important objectives in this regard has been to secure membership in the World
Trade Organization (WTO). Taiwan’s Trade Profile Like most countries in the
region, Taiwan trades a great deal with the world’s major trading
partners—the United States, Japan, Europe and mainland China by route of Hong
Kong. It is worth noting that Taiwan’s trade with the world is geographically
and nationally diversified. Taiwan’s total trading reaches the one
billion-dollar threshold with 15 countries, including a number, such as Canada,
Switzerland, and Brazil, that lie well outside of the Asian region. See Tables
1, 2, and 3, respectively, for “Taiwan’s Top Trading Partners,”
“Taiwan’s 10 Major Export Markets,” and “Taiwan’s 10 Major Import
Sources” for the years 1997 and 1998. Similarly, Taiwan’s imports from the
world are diversified. As would be expected from an island with limited natural
resources, Taiwan imports a considerable amount of agricultural products and
petroleum along with a wide range of industrial products, including chemicals,
steel products, electrical machinery, household appliances, wood, and paper
products. Although it is also a major exporter of the same, Taiwan imports a
substantial volume of textile products. See Table 4 for “Taiwan’s Major
Imports” for the years 1997 and 1998. As Taiwan liberalizes trade in
connection to WTO accession, a substantial portion of the growth is likely to be
in these same sectors. [It should be noted that Taiwan has succeeded in having a
WTO working party formed to consider its application to the WTO and has
completed bilateral negotiations with all members of the working group. Shortly,
the working group could close its work and send the package for Taiwan’s
membership to the larger WTO General Council for a final vote on its
membership.] Taiwan is also a substantial exporter of a number of industrial
products. Although Taiwan does export some agricultural products, given its
small land area and limited endowment of natural resources, its comparative
advantage lies in the production of manufactured products. Since most countries
already grant Taiwan “Most Favored Nation” (MFN) tariff treatment
voluntarily, WTO accession is thus less likely to have immediate impact on
Taiwan’s export volume or composition. Over time, however, the dynamic
benefits of an increased selection of products and composition will likely spur
overall growth and movement of resources within Taiwan’s economy. These
changes may have a long-term impact on Taiwan’s exports. See Table 5 for
“Taiwan’s Major Exports” for the years 1997 and 1998. Taiwan’s Trade
Regime Like a number of its Asian neighbors, Taiwan’s economy was protected in
many sectors in the 1950s and 1960s. As part of a trade liberalization effort
encouraged by Taiwan’s major trading partners, notably the United States in
accordance with WTO accession, many of these trade barriers have been reduced or
dismantled in recent years. However, substantial barriers remain in a number of
sectors. In an effort to attract more international trade, Taiwan has
substantially reduced the applied level of tariffs over the years. Taiwan’s
average nominal tariff rate of 8.2 percent is similar to that of other developed
countries and it is scheduled to be lowered to five percent in WTO accession
talks.19 For comparison, the average U.S. tariff rate is just over five
percent.20 These tariff concessions will ultimately impact 3,470 industrial
products and 1,021 agricultural products.21 Beyond that, however, the average
tariff hides the fact that in a number of sectors, tariffs remain important
barriers to trade. As is the case in many countries, tariff spikes are quite
high in a number of sectors; automobiles and agriculture provide two notable
examples. Many countries have employed various trade barriers to protect the
automotive sector. In the case of Taiwan, most of this protection has come in
the form of tariffs. Currently, tariffs on passenger vehicles range slightly
over 60 percent bringing the average tariff on automobiles to almost 44
percent.22 At this level, tariffs have a strong impact on trade and a
substantial restraint on imports. There are similar high tariffs on imports of
auto parts; auto part tariffs reach over 20 percent and average over 17
percent.23 Most of these tariffs, however, will be reduced substantially upon
WTO accession. The average tariffs on automobiles will fall to 16 percent and
auto parts tariffs to just over 10 percent.24 At these levels, tariffs will
still impact trade, but imports of both can be expected to rise substantially.
In the agricultural sector, tariffs as well as non-tariff measures (NTMs) are
also quite significant. Tariffs on many meat products exceed 50 percent and
tariffs on various types of fruits and vegetables are also prohibitive.25
Taiwan’s textile and apparel market is also potentially a promising export
opportunity for many developing countries around the world although Taiwan
itself imports a significant volume of textiles and apparel. Most of the formal
protection in this sector is provided by tariffs, which average almost 12
percent. Upon completing accession to the WTO, the average tariff on textiles
will be lowered by about 20 percent—to under 10 percent.26 At this level,
tariffs will still restrain imports, but substantial trade opportunities will be
created and tariffs on specific products will decline even more dramatically,
creating various niche opportunities. In the industrial sector, tariffs are
already fairly low. For example, tariffs on semiconductors are now at less than
one percent and scheduled to fall to zero.27 Tariffs on semiconductor
manufacturing equipment are now just under six percent and scheduled to be cut
by more than 50 percent.28 Tariffs on a number of consumer electronic products,
such as cassette players, are sizeable—many in the low teens—and also
scheduled for substantial reduction.29 Tariff reductions on these and other
consumer products will undoubtedly create substantial opportunities for
Taiwan’s trading partners and more business opportunities for Taiwanese
companies. Of course, tariffs are not the only barriers to trade. A number of
products are also subject to various trade licensing and import permit
restrictions in Taiwan. These restrictions affect several hundred product
classifications and in cases ranging from pharmaceuticals to sport fishing
boats, they constitute significant barriers to imports.30 Notable restrictions
are also applied to a number of agricultural products, including sugar and
rice.31 Foreign companies exporting to Taiwan have also raised issues regarding
various arbitrarily enforced standards on products, such as air conditioners.32
Taiwan’s import system for alcohol and tobacco products has also been
criticized as “cumbersome and costly.”33 Many of these non-tariff barriers
are the subject of ongoing bilateral discussions with major trading partners and
inconsistent with the WTO and would be reduced or eliminated by the WTO
accession process. As is the case with a number of countries, Taiwan also
enforces substantial government procurement preferences and requirements that
limit the importation of foreign goods and services. Taiwan’s technology
transfer requirements have also drawn some criticism, particularly in the
aerospace sector. Taiwan has, however, agreed to adhere to the WTO Government
Procurement Agreement upon accession to the WTO and has voluntarily undertaken
some reform in this area.34 Protection of intellectual property in Taiwan has
been a long-standing trade issue between the United States and Taiwan. Piracy in
various forms has been a significant problem in the past. Through several
bilateral agreements with the United States and a number of legislative changes,
Taiwan has brought intellectual property protection to a high-level—comparable
to that of most other developed countries. Concerns are sometimes raised,
however, concerning some alleged connections between Taiwanese firms and piracy
on the mainland. As a developed country, Taiwan would be bound to fully adhere
to WTO provisions on Trade Related Intellectual Property (TRIPs) upon
accession.35 In addition, as is the case in a number of countries, Taiwan
maintains substantial restrictions with regard to a number of services.
Financial services and telecommunications services are two sectors in which
there is substantial potential for imports. Taiwan has voluntarily liberalized
in both sectors and made particularly significant moves regarding
telecommunications services. Taiwan has also agreed to fully participate in the
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) upon WTO accession.36 As noted,
Taiwan has substantially reduced both tariff and non-tariff barriers and
improved protection of intellectual property voluntarily over the years. In a
number of sectors, however, WTO membership as a developed country would commit
Taiwan to economically significant further liberalization. CONCLUSION Taiwan and
the world trading system have a complex history. Even without formal membership
in the trading system, Taiwan has developed into an important trading partner
for many countries. Despite the lingering impact of the Asian Economic Crisis,
Taiwan’s total trade with the world has approached $250 billion in 1999;
placing Taiwan in the top rank of trading powers. From the perspective of the
WTO and its trading partners, Taiwan has proven itself a responsible trading
power. In the last decade, Taiwan has greatly liberalized its trading system;
tariffs and NTMs have come down and protection of intellectual property has
improved to a level consistent with other developed countries. There are still
areas in Taiwan’s trading regime which could be improved, but Taiwan’s
economy is already more open than that of most of its Asian neighbors. Unlike
the PRC and many current members of the WTO, Taiwan’s trading regime is
already in compliance with the provisions of the WTO. Upon accession to the WTO,
Taiwan has agreed to undertake a series of additional trade liberalizing
measures that will open billions of dollars in new trade opportunities annually
for its trading partners and for Taiwan itself. Certainly, Taiwan’s largest
trading partners, such as the United States and Japan, will enjoy a substantial
share of these new opportunities, however, Taiwan is a diversified trader that
maintains substantial trade relationships with many countries. All of these are
likely to see some additional export opportunities and some countries that do
not currently trade with Taiwan may also enjoy some benefits and in the end,
Taiwan’s membership in the WTO will strengthen the WTO as an institution. The
trade liberalization that results will benefit Taiwan, Taiwan’s trading
partners, and the world trading system. The economy of Taiwan is undoubtedly
affected and will continue to be affected by the loosening of trade restraints.
Because of the relative small size of the island and lack of natural resources,
many Taiwanese companies have already been forced to transfer to Mainland China
where their operating expenses are significantly lower due to availability of
space and cheaper labor. With further liberalization of import tariffs,
Taiwanese companies will be further challenged by the influx of cheaper foreign
goods. Unless Taiwanese companies gear themselves to handle the changing market
and competition, they will lose a significant share of their home and foreign
markets and also be forced to move to mainland China or somewhere else that
offers cheap labor. In addition, Taiwanese companies will have to invest in
newer technologies to further compete with the ever-increasing number of foreign
companies. Along with the negative effects of trade liberalization, there are
also positive outcomes for the Taiwanese economy. With imports at lower tariff
rates, the people of Taiwan will experience increased buying power. The standard
of living will also increase since Taiwanese will have a wider range of products
at cheaper prices from which to purchase. Taiwanese companies will be forced to
raise the quality of their products and services in order to compete with
foreign companies thus affording the Taiwanese people more product for their
money and ultimately increase spending— leading to an even more robust
economy. REFERENCES 1. “Taiwan’s Twenty Years of Economic Expansion.”
Taiwan Almanac. 29 March 1999. Viewed on: 15 April 2000 *www.taiwaninformation.org/almanac/economy/essay4-032999.html*.
2. “Taiwan’s Twenty Years of Economic Expansion.” 3. “Taiwan’s Twenty
Years of Economic Expansion.” 4. “Taiwan’s Twenty Years of Economic
Expansion.” 5. “Taiwan’s Economy Remains on Track,” The Washington
Times, 8 October 1999, Viewed on: 15 April 2000 *www.washtimes.com/internatlads/taiwan99/6.html*.
6. “Taiwan’s Economy Remains on Track.” 7. “Taiwan’s Economy Remains
on Track.” 8. “Taiwan’s Economy Remains on Track.” 9. “The Flexible
Tiger,” The Economist 3 Jan. 1998: p. 73. 10. “The Flexible Tiger.” 11.
“The Flexible Tiger.” 12. “The Flexible Tiger.” 13. Tanzer, Andrew.
“Tight Little Island,” Forbes 12 January 1998: p. 52-53. 14. “Tight Little
Island.” 15. “Tight Little Island.” 16. “Tight Little Island.” 17.
Taiwanese Trade Statistics. Viewed on: 15 April 2000. *www.cetra.org.tw/english/statistics/indexset.htm*.
18. Taiwanese Trade Statistics. 19. Taiwanese Trade Statistics. 20. U.S. Trade
Statistics. Viewed on: 15 April 2000. *www.ita.doc.gov.*. 21. Dr. Mastel, Greg.
Taiwan in the WTO: An Economic and Policy Analysis. 6 October 1999. Viewed on:
15 April 2000 *www.taipei.org/un/wto0223.htm*. 22. Taiwan in the WTO: An
Economic and Policy Analysis. 23. Taiwan in the WTO: An Economic and Policy
Analysis. 24. Taiwan in the WTO: An Economic and Policy Analysis. 25. Taiwan in
the WTO: An Economic and Policy Analysis. 26. Taiwan in the WTO: An Economic and
Policy Analysis. 27. Taiwan in the WTO: An Economic and Policy Analysis. 28.
Taiwan in the WTO: An Economic and Policy Analysis. 29. Taiwan in the WTO: An
Economic and Policy Analysis. 30. United States Trade Representative. 1998
National (U.S.) Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers. Washington
D.C.: GPO, 1998. P.318. 31. 1998 National (U.S.) Trade Estimate Report on
Foreign Trade Barriers. 32. 1998 National (U.S.) Trade Estimate Report on
Foreign Trade Barriers. P. 319. 33. 1998 National (U.S.) Trade Estimate Report
on Foreign Trade Barriers. P. 326. 34. 1998 National (U.S.) Trade Estimate
Report on Foreign Trade Barriers. P. 320-321 35. 1998 National (U.S.) Trade
Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers. P. 322. 36. 1998 National (U.S.)
Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers. P. 323-324. TABLE 1: Taiwan’s
Top Trading Partners and Total Trade in 1997 & 1998 (in US$ Millions).
Country 1997 1998 United States 52,785.6 49,067.7 Japan 40,712.7 36,350.2 Hong
Kong 30,684.2 26,793.6 Germany 9,059.8 9,235.8 Korea 7,390.4 7,156.4 France
6,120.3 6,706.1 Netherlands 5,936.3 5,960.6 Singapore 8,045.0 5,956.0 Malaysia
7,263.7 5,909.8 United Kingdom 5,231.0 4,990.4 Australia 5,090.2 4,544.7
Thailand 4,489.0 3,893.8 Philippines 3,617.1 3,757.7 Indonesia 4,318.5 3,150.2
Italy 2,735.2 2,826.4 Canada 3,184.9 2,732.9 Saudi Arabia 2,395.4 1,622.5
Belgium 1,341.5 1,447.2 Switzerland 1,420.6 1,413.3 Brazil 1,673.3 1,259.4
Others 33,010.4 30,604.8 Total 236,505.1 215,379.8 Source: CETRA TABLE 2:
Taiwan’s 10 Major Export Markets in 1997 & 1998 (in US$ Millions). Country
1997 1998 United States 29,551.8 29,386.0 Hong Kong 28,688.1 24,841.3 Japan
11,691.0 9,331.7 Netherlands 4,298.0 4,369.3 Germany 3,690.6 4,086.8 United
Kingdom 3,278.2 3,280.2 Singapore 4,894.6 3,259.1 Malaysia 3,035.4 2,286.8
Philippines 2,242.5 1,934.7 Thailand 2,562.1 1,926.1 Others 28,148.3 25,938.0
Total 122,080.6 110,640.0 Source: CETRA. TABLE 3: Taiwan’s 10 Major Import
Sources in 1997 & 1998 (in US$ Millions). Country 1997 1998 Japan 29021.7
27018.8 United States 23233.8 19681.7 Korea 5024.5 5670.2 France 4726 5328.5
Germany 5369.2 5149 Malaysia 4228.3 3623 Australia 3217.2 2912.9 Singapore
3150.4 2697 Thailand 1926.9 1967.7 Hong Kong 1996.1 1952.3 Others 32530.4
28738.7 Total 114424.5 104739.8 Source: CETRA TABLE 4: Taiwan’s Major Imports
in 1997 & 1998 (in US$ Millions). Commodities 1997 1998 Electronic Products
18,656.8 18,110.2 Machinery 11,475.1 12,050.2 Chemicals 11,440.1 9,550.7
Transport Equipment 5,360.7 5,595.7 Info. & Comm. Products 3,531.8 5,296.6
Precision Instruments 6,375.5 5,192.4 Iron & Steel 6,137.8 5,167.8 Metal
Products 5,356.5 4,334.5 Minerals 5,217.7 4,279.8 Raw Materials 3,821.0 3,973.8
Others 30,788.1 46,049.1 Total 114,424.6 104,739.8 Source: CETRA TABLE 5:
Taiwan’s Major Exports in 1997 & 1998 (in US$ Millions). Commodities 1997
1998 Electronic Products 18,024.0 16,911.6 Info. & Comm. Products 14,441.8
13,773.9 Fiber, Yarn, Linen & Fabric 11,741.5 10,246.8 Machinery 9,651.3
7,809.6 Plastic & Rubber 7,716.3 6,873.2 Iron & Steel 6,649.4 6,408.7
Transport Equipment 5,587.6 5,216.2 Metal Product 4,881.3 4,471.6 Electrical
Machinery 4,767.8 4,354.7 Chemicals 3,277.6 2,858.1 Others 35,341.9 31,715.6
Total 122,080.5 110,640.0 Source: CETRA

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