Anselm concludes that one requires two wills to be free by arguing that to be
free is to have an ability. In this paper I will argue that Anselm believes that
this ability is incompatible with an Aristotelian doctrine of the will and that
to have this ability, we must have at least two wills. Only in such a model is
one free. Then I will argue that the agent who abandons justice differs from the
one-willed creature Anselm considers in chapter 13,because the latter is not
acting freely, whereas the former is acting freely. In the 3rd meditation of
Meditations on First Philosophy, Descartes thinks he has proved the existence of
God. Given that God is good, and that he exists, Descartes must now explain why
we make mistakes. He argues that we make mistakes because we make judgments
about ideas that are not clear and distinct. If we refrained from making
judgments in those cases, we would not make any errors. This raises a puzzle:
Granted that we can constrain our will when we don’t have clear and distinct
ideas, can we constrain our will when we do have clear and distinct ideas? Or
are we compelled to judge on things of which we have clear and distinct ideas?
If the latter is the case, then it appears we don’t have a free will which
would raise serious issues about responsibility for sin and so forth. According
to the Aristotelian doctrine of the will, our will is directed towards a single
end, which is happiness. All deliberation that one makes will be in regards to
the means to this single end. There can be no mistake in the direction of the
will. If a mistake is made, it will be in the deliberation process or in the
execution of the desired means to the end. In either case, the mistake will be
such that one has no control over it. Otherwise if one did have control over it
then one would simply deliberate the potential mistake. But, Anselm thinks,
since mistakes are made, and they must be explained in terms of the will since
everything is done according to the will, then it would appear that there must
be some sort of malfunction in the way in which we were designed by God. But he
assumes that God did not make an error in the creation of man because doing so
would make God less that perfect. The general worry in the Aristotelian doctrine
of the will is that since there is a single end, then we can’t make opposite
judgments because there is only a single will. We are compelled to act on our
will, and that would rule out the possibility of free will, and responsibility
that goes along with free will. In chapter 4, Anselm explains this problem in
discussing how the Devil sinned. He writes, T. But no one keeps justice except
by willing what he ought, and no one deserts justice except by willing what he
ought not. S. No one doubts this. T. Therefore, by willing something that he was
not supposed to will at that time, he deserted justice and thereby sinned. S.
This follows. But I ask: What did he will? T. Whatever he already had in his
possession he was supposed to will. S. Yes, he was supposed to will what he had
received from God, and he did not sin by willing that. T. Therefore, he willed
something which he did not already have and was not supposed to will at that
time. – S. I cannot deny that this follows. T. But [the Devil] was able to
will nothing except what is just or beneficial. The thought is that if we have
one end which is happiness, then everything we will is willed in accordance with
this end. Therefore, if the Devil deserted justice, he did it by willing in
accordance with this single end. That being the case, how could his deserting of
justice have possibly been a sin, since it was done in accordance with the will
he had been given by God? The only way the Devil could have sinned was by acting
contrary to his will, which Anselm thinks is impossible if you only have one
will. What is necessary but absent in the Aristotelian model is the liberty of
indifference. The liberty of indifference is to be able to make a contradictory
judgment or refrain from judgment, even in the face of a powerful inclination.
That is to say that even when the idea is presented to the will by the intellect
with clarity and distinctness, the will is not compelled to judge and can judge
otherwise. In the Aristotelian model, however, mistakes that are made involve
irrationality because there is only one will. Therefore, in order for a mistake
not to involve irrationality, Anselm thinks we need two wills. Otherwise it
would appear as though we make irrational mistakes because we are not rational
enough, which would indicate that God erred in his creation of man. By
‘will’, Anselm does not mean two distinct instruments for willing. Rather,
he proposes that the will have two inclinations. One inclination is the do what
makes us happy because we seek happiness, and the other inclination is to do
what is right because it is right. The fact that there are two wills makes it
possible that we might choose one over the other. This view makes the liberty of
indifference possible because acting contrary to one will does not make it
necessary that we be making an irrational mistake. The Anselmian model of two
wills allows one to be free because in certain cases we have the ability to
choose one inclination over the other. In the Aristotelian model, since we could
only do what we will to do, there is essentially no freedom to choose since
there is only one will. Freedom implies that there be an ability to choose
between two choices, which entails responsibility. In chapter 5, the teacher
says to the student, “You are certain that if the good angels were not able to
sin, then they kept justice not by their own ability but by necessity. It would
follow that they no more merited grace from God because they remained standing
while the others fell than because they preserved rationality, which they were
unable to lose.” The teacher seems the think that it is not appropriate that
God give grace to the angels that did not fall if falling was not a possibility.
If their uprightness was guaranteed then there was never a possibility that they
could fall, which would imply that the good angels took no part in their
remaining upright. Yet it seems unwarranted, in this case, that God should give
them grace. To deserve God’s grace, it must be the case that the angels chose
to remain upright, which entails that they are upright because of their own
ability. So in any given case where the intellect presents to the will ideas
that are clear and distinct, it may be that we choose between means that which
will make us happy, or between means that are just. And we may also face having
to choose between what makes us happy or what is just. In either case we have
the ability to choose, and so we have freedom of will. It is clear, Anselm seems
to think, that Satan sinned because he deserted justice. An objection might be
made that since Satan no longer possesses justice he only possesses the will for
happiness. If he only has the will for happiness, then he can’t be responsible
for his sins since he would only be acting then in accordance with the only will
he has. Therefore, he no longer has free will, as in the Aristotelian model.
Anselm disagrees, and in chapter 13 he describes the one-willed creature that
would not be subject to free will. This creature will not be able to will
anything other than happiness since the will for happiness is the only will he
has. Furthermore, he will will to a further degree that which he thinks will
bring the greatest happiness. It follows that since this is the only will he
has, he can’t stop willing happiness because he would have to will to stop,
and that will is distinct from the will for happiness which has already been
postulated as being the only will. God is the greatest happiness, but this
creature can’t be God so he will will any lesser benefits he is able to
attain. Anselm writes, T. When he willed unclean and very base benefits in which
irrational animals take pleasure, wouldn’t this same will be unjust and
blameworthy? S. How would it be unjust and blameworthy, for it would will what
it had received not to be able to keep from willing? T. However, it is evident
that this will is the work of God, whether when it wills the loftiest benefits
or when it wills the basest ones. And it is evident that neither justice nor
injustice is in this will. – Therefore, insofar as [this will] is a being, it
is something good. But as far as justice or injustice is concerned, [this will]
is neither good nor evil. Since this creature is operating under the only will
it has, the justice or injustice of its actions are irrelevant. In essence, this
creature is not acting freely. The Devil is given both the will for happiness
and justice. Unlike the one-willed creature, the Devil is free to choose. Anselm
writes in chapter 14, “Thus possessing a just will-for-happiness he could and
should be happy. And by not willing what he ought no to will, although able [to
will it], he would merit never to be able to will what he ought not to will. And
by always keeping justice by means of a tempered will, he would in no way
experience need.” It happens to be, however, that the Devil realizes that what
would make him happy is to be like God insofar as having an autonomous will.
That is to say, doing things because he wants to do them. But this would require
that he abandon justice, which is to do what God wants him to do because God
wants him to do it. Nevertheless, he believes that although he must abandon
justice he will increase his happiness, and so he chooses to do so. The
Devil’s situation having deserted justice is different from the situation of
the one-willed creature. In chapter 16, Anselm explains, T. Before that will
received this justice, was it under obligation to will and not to will in
accordance with justice? S. No, it was not under an obligation with respect to
what it had not received and therefore did not have. T. However, you do not
doubt that it was under an obligation after it received [justice] – unless it
were to lose [justice] as the result of some overpowering force? S. I think that
the will is always bound to this obligation whether it keeps what it has
received or whether it willingly deserts it. The thought is that though having
deserted justice it would appear that the Devil is no longer subject to justice,
he ought to have justice and since he no longer has justice then he is deemed
unjust. The one-willed creature was not unjust because it was not the case the
justice should be there, whereas the Devil has deserted justice and in so doing
created a void. In this case, since one can’t be happy without being just, the
Devil has made a big mistake and now he is neither just nor happy. Nevertheless,
despite the fact the Devil is operating solely under the will for happiness, he
still has a free will. He realizes that he is mistaken and he wants to regain
justice. But he can never regain justice because that requires that he do the
right thing because it is the right thing to do. The Devil wants to do the right
thing because he wants to be happy. That is to say that he knows he can’t be
happy without doing the right thing. Therefore he will never be able to do the
right thing because it is the right thing to do. So he will never regain justice
and will always be operating under the will-for happiness. But this is not to
say that he is not operating with a free will, like the one-willed creature.