1. Introduction In this paper I wish to consider the following related
questions: (i) Can a system of morality be justified?; (ii) Why should one act
morally?; (iii) How can others be persuaded to act morally? Clearly none of
these questions is new, and moral philosophers have proposed a variety of
responses to them over the centuries without reaching any general agreement.
Nevertheless, because these questions are fundamental to any practical
application of moral theory, it is worthwhile to continue to reflect upon them.
For Jewish, Christian and Muslim societies, the justification of morality is the
Word of God as expressed in the Bible and Koran. Given an authoritative text
containing basic moral premises, the appropriate method for obtaining rules of
conduct is a process of logical deduction from those premises to conclusions.
However, if we focus our inquiry on European and American societies in the
present century, the decline of belief in religious authority has undermined
this approach to moral theory for many people. This monumental change-for
morality-may be attributed to many factors. An increase in multicultural studies
has emphasized the wide variety of beliefs that human beings hold, which may
have led more people to doubt that any one of them is authoritative. A number of
writers over the years have commented on the correspondence of specific
religious beliefs with one's society of birth, again leading thoughtful
individuals to question the authority of their childhood religious beliefs. As a
general sociological observation, one can point to a positive correlation
between increasing educational level and a diminished belief in the authority of
religious texts. When thoughtful persons reject religious authority as the basis
of morality, it becomes necessary to find another basis for moral beliefs. One
of the few statements about contemporary moral philosophy which is unlikely to
encounter opposition is that no moral theory enjoys wide acceptance. At present
the most widely discussed theories of morality in the British-American
literature are utilitarianism, deontology and social contract theory. The well
known utilitarian approach to ethical (note 1) decision making was proposed by
Jeremy Bentham in his Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation
(1789) and elaborated by John Stuart Mill in several books, e.g., Utilitarianism
(1863). In Chapter 1, Bentham defines utility as that which "tends to
produce benefit, advantage, pleasure, good, or happiness (all this in the
present case comes to the same thing)". Utilitarianism is then based on two
premises (which are not always sufficiently separated in discussions of the
theory). The first premise is the belief in consequentialism. Specifically, that
morality is concerned with the effects of actions on the happiness of
individuals. The second premise is a belief in a maximization principle.
Specifically, the right action is the one which has as its consequence the
greatest happiness of the greatest number. It is not easy to realize in today's
society what a radical departure the first premise was from the conventional
wisdom of its time. The second premise is a foundation of todays ubiquitous use
of cost-benefit analysis. Deontological theories of morality take as their
premise the belief that human beings have an intuitive knowledge of right and
wrong. Associated with this approach is the belief that human beings have
certain rights, and that actions which adversely affect such rights are morally
wrong. Historically, one immediately thinks of the rights to life, liberty, and
the pursuit of happiness; currently, one is aware of the demands for woman's
rights, gay rights, and a variety of economic rights. Since most of us do have
strong feelings of right and wrong, there surely is a psychological basis for
the deontological approach to morality. Social contract theory as developed by
Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau takes as its premise that there is an agreement
between an individual and society in which the individual agrees to submit to
the authority of the government and its laws in return for the government's
protection of the individual's life and property. These theories were primarily
concerned with the moral obligations of citizens and governments. An
influential, modern variant of the social contract approach to morality is given
in John Rawls' A Theory of Justice. Rawls (1971, p. 12) considers a hypothetical
initial situation in which "no one knows his place in society, his class
position or social status, nor does anyone know his fortune in the distribution
of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence, strength and the like...
[thus] the principles of justice are chosen behind a veil of ignorance". He
then deduces what principles of justice would be agreed to by rational
individuals in such an initial situation. Rawls notes that his book is not a
complete contract theory, but that the contractarian idea can be extended to an
entire ethical system. What are some of the major objections which have been
raised against each of these theories? The maximization principle of
utilitarianism gives a clear theoretical basis for moral decision making.
However, it takes little reflection to conclude that its practical
implementation presents grave difficulties. Before deciding upon a course of
action, the utilitarian is asked to consider its effects on the entire
population and-although this is not explicitly mentioned-over an indefinite
period of time. It is doubtful that many pure utilitarians exist. Practical
difficulty aside, the basic objection to utilitarianism is the refusal of most
people to agree with the premise that maximization of happiness for the entire
population should be the basis for all moral decision making. The hypothetical
situation created by John Harris in "The Survival Lottery" (1975)
provides an extreme example of the conflict between happiness maximization and
individual rights. Two patients, Y and Z, are dying. Y needs a heart transplant
and Z needs a lung transplant to survive, but their doctors tell them that since
no organs are available they will die of natural causes. Y and Z then insist
that the proper moral decision is to kill one healthy man, X, to save the two of
them. However, observation suggests that most members of our society would
disagree. Why? Because most would agree with the deontological view that X has a
"right" to life which must not be abrogated to increase total
happiness. Thus while it is conceivable that a society of humans (or
post-humans) might someday exist whose moral sense was in innate agreement with
utilitarianism, that is not the case at present. A number of objections have
been raised to the version of social contract theory developed by Rawls. By a
series of arguments Rawls (1971, pp. 60, 302) deduces that rational persons
operating under a "veil of ignorance" would choose two principles.
(First) Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive system of
basic liberties compatible with similar liberty for all. (Second) Economic
inequalities are to be arranged to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged.
While there is little argument over the first principle, the second principle
(which is Rawls' contribution to the theory of distributive justice) is
controversial. The argument for the second principle uses a maximin rule for
choice under uncertainty (Rawls, 1971, pp. 150-158). It assumes that rational
persons will agree to a system for distributing economic goods whose worst
outcome (for any person) is better than the worst outcome of any alternate
system. While many persons (particularly those of mature years and conservative
instincts) would choose the economic distribution system Rawls suggests, it can
be objected that many others (particularly the young and daring) would not.
Unless one defines a rational person as one who follows the maximin rule, the
question of whether real persons would agree with Rawls could only be decided by
a sociological survey. A more general objection to Rawls, and to any social
contract theory based upon a hypothetical or historical agreement, is: Why
should such an agreement be morally binding on contemporary individuals who are
not choosing a moral system under conditions of ignorance? A basic moral
question debated in the philosophical literature is illustrated in an extreme
form by Judith J. Thomson in "Killing, Letting Die, and the Trolley
Problem" (1976). In this paper the author constructs a series of cases in
which an agent (the driver of a runaway trolley) must choose between either
killing/letting die an innocent person or saving five other innocent persons.
This problem, of which there are many variations, highlights the conflict
between the deontological and consequentialist approaches to morality. The
deontologist believes that individuals have certain moral rights which cannot be
sacrificed for the benefit of others; the consequentialist believes that morally
correct action depends on its effects. The primary objection to the
deontological view is that, in the absence of religious authority, its adherents
provide no alternative basis for their choice of moral rights. Their final
appeal, as expressed in many papers, is to "moral intuition" or
"what we know is right". In the next section we discuss the sources of
our moral intuition and suggest an alternative approach to morality using
elements of systems described above. 2. Analysis The moral system we propose
takes as its premises (i) a belief in consequentialism, viz., that the morally
correct action depends upon its effects, and (ii) a belief that the effects
desired are those which promote happiness. In choosing happiness as the goal of
morality, we are in agreement with Mill's assertion in Chapter 4 of
Utilitarianism "that happiness is desirable, and the only thing desirable,
as an end; all other things being only desirable as means to that end".
Note, however, that our formulation will differ from utilitarianism in not
adopting the maximization of happiness as a premise. A philosophic question of
immense importance to individuals living in a society with a common moral system
is whose happiness is considered of moral importance. Historically, most
societies did not believe the happiness of slaves to be of moral importance. At
an opposite extreme, Nietzsche proposed that only the welfare of the Superman is
significant. We propose, in agreement with the almost universal prevailing
opinion, to assume that the happiness of all men/women is of equal moral
importance. We noted in section 1 the practical difficulty in using a moral
system in which all decisions are made ab initio. Our proposed system includes
moral rules which confer rights on individuals. It differs fundamentally from
pure deontological systems in that these rights are not absolute. Using
philosophical terminology they are prima facie rights in the sense that "
'the right to X' is always to be understood as 'the right to X unless some
stronger claim shows up' " (Feinberg, 1973, p. 73). These rights are to be
derived from moral rules which give the best consequences over an extended time
period. Exercise of such rights may decrease the happiness of some individuals
or even of most of society in the short term. In this sense we agree with the
objective of utilitarianism on a long term basis, but not as a system for making
short term decisions. As an example of the application of this approach to the
moral question raised in "Killing, Letting Die, and The Trolley
Problem", one would be justified in killing one innocent person to save
five other innocent persons because there is no absolute right not to be killed.
As applied to "The Survival Lottery" one can uphold X's right not to
be killed against the needs of Y and Z for organ transplants because there is no
maximization principle to be satisfied. As mentioned in Section 1, most people
do have strong feelings of right and wrong. Where do moral rules come from? In
many societies most moral beliefs come from a religious tradition. Some moral
rules are common to the major religions. Notable among these is the prohibition
against killing-with exceptions for self defense, wars and execution of
criminals. Other moral rules differ among religions. An example here would be
the Jewish-Catholic-Protestant limitation to one wife and the Muslim-early
Mormon approval of multiple wives. While the traditional religious basis for
these rules is the authority of a sacred text, we would suggest that their
origin is consequential in that they represent the rationalization of experience
accumulated over time. Those moral rules which are common to nearly all
societies (both religious and non-religious) we believe to result from something
which is common to "human nature", i.e., nearly all societies find
their consequences to be more positive than negative. From the consequentialist
viewpoint, moral rules which differ among societies are cultural decisions based
upon each society's historical evolution. History shows that moral rules evolve
over time. A most striking example is slavery. It is now almost universally
agreed that the institution of slavery is immoral. Yet almost up to modern times
citizens who considered themselves to be highly moral owned slaves. At present
only "animal rights" advocates, a small minority, consider it immoral
to kill animals for food or use them in medical research. In future times will
the present majority who disregard animal rights be considered to be as immoral
as those who formerly accepted slavery? The morality of slavery and animal
rights is fundamentally related to the question of who are members of the social
group to whom the rules of morality apply. One way in which the evolution of
morality can be viewed is as the expansion of the concept of society-defined as
the group to whom one's moral rules apply-from family, to clan, to city, to
country, to all persons, and (perhaps) to animals. At the beginning of this
section we proposed two premises for a moral system: (i) a belief in
consequentialism, and (ii) a belief in the promotion of happiness. To complete
the logical basis of the system, we propose (iii) a belief that moral rules
should be choices made by a society to promote the happiness of its members. In
making these choices members of the society will be guided by experience-thus we
have called this system "An empirical approach to morality". This
approach to morality views rights as group decisions codified in law and custom.
In order for the system to be viable, a large majority of its members must be in
agreement with the moral rules of their society. In this sense we are proposing
a contractualist type of moral theory. It differs from the approach of Rawls in
that the agreement is between the current members of a society who have
knowledge of the real world. Under this system individuals will choose moral
rules for society which they believe will promote their happiness. These choices
depend on innate factors-what makes human beings happy-and on conditions in the
society in which the choices are made. In an "unfair" society, an
oppressed minority/majority may subscribe to a different set of moral choices
(which could be called a sub-group contract). As an example, the tale of Robin
Hood comes immediately to mind. An empirical approach to morality explicitly
recognizes that moral rules should change with time as societies evolve. In
section 3, for an imperfect democratic society such as our own, we will suggest
how an empirical moralist would approach some of our present moral
controversies. We are now in a position to respond to the three basic moral
questions raised at the beginning of this essay: Can a system of morality be
justified? In any logical argument in which conclusions are deduced, some
propositions must be taken as premises. In science these are called axioms, and
they are justified (but, as Hume showed, not proved) by induction from
experience. Moral conclusions have been deduced from three major types of
premises which can be abbreviated as the sacred text premise; the intuitive
knowledge of right and wrong premise; and the dependence on consequences
premise. We would argue that none of these premises can be "justified"
by arguments from more basic principles, and should therefore be characterized
as "beliefs" as we have done in proposing empirical morality as a
consequences based theory. To recapitulate, the premises we propose as a basis
for moral choices are: What is morally correct depends upon consequences; the
desired consequences are those leading to happiness; moral rules should be
choices made to promote happiness. It follows from the previous development that
in a society that is functioning with an empirical system of morality, a typical
person will be happier, in at least most situations, if he/she acts morally.
Here a typical person is defined as a member of the predominate group in the
society that agrees with the moral rules which have been chosen. In any society,
however, there will be non-typical persons who do not agree with certain moral
rules. Since, as has been stated, the empirical approach recognizes that moral
rules evolve over time, it should be expected that such a minority of
non-typical members will try to persuade the majority to modify those moral
rules with which they disagree. In urging these changes, the minority would
appeal to empirical evidence which (they would argue) shows that the majority
would be happier if the modified rules were adopted. Why should one act morally?
In the philosophical literature the question has been put in the form, "Why
should an individual act in accordance with moral rules when it conflicts with
self-interest?" Here the concept of self-interest is of crucial importance
in discussing real behavior, but it does not appear to have received much
analysis. In analogy with the previous discussion of "rights", we
propose a distinction between prima facie self-interest and overall
self-interest. An action is defined to be in an individual's prima facie
self-interest if its immediate consequences increase the individuals happiness.
In order for an action to be in an individuals overall self-interest, its
cumulative effects over the lifetime of the individual must result in a positive
balance of happiness over unhappiness. In literature and in life there are
numerous examples of people who commit murder because it is in their prima facie
self-interest, but discover at later times that the action was not in their
overall self-interest. As an opposite example, people who engage in civil
disobedience are aware that such action is not in their prima facie
self-interest, but may believe that it is in their overall self-interest because
its long term beneficial effects on society will increase their personal
happiness. Civil disobedience is an (extreme) example of the ethically important
observation that many people have developed a "conscience" that leads
them to feel happiness when their actions increase the happiness of others (note
2). (It should be recalled from the beginning of this section that we and using
a broad definition of happiness as "the only thing desirable as an
end.") A society which has adopted an empirical approach to morality has
chosen moral rules which a large majority believe will promote the happiness of
its members. It therefore follows that it will be in the overall self-interest
of most of its members to act morally most of the time. In those situations when
this is not the case, however, we must agree with other ethical writers that
consequentialist morality does not support an argument that persons should act
against their overall self-interest. This leads to the third question, "How
can others be persuaded to act morally?" From the preceding discussion it
is clear that the way to persuade others to act morally is to convince them that
it is in their overall self-interest to do so. What are some of the factors that
affect an individuals overall self-interest? We consider the general problem of
corruption as an example. An individual is offered a bribe to take an action
which violates the moral, and possibly the legal, rules of his society. (For
grammatical simplicity we assume it is a male.) He may feel that it is in his
prima facie self-interest to accept, since spending the money could give him
happiness. However, as a rational person he knows that other factors must be
considered in determining whether acceptance of the bribe is in his overall
self-interest. These factors are of both an internal and external nature. The
dominant internal factor is his conscience. How much unhappiness would the
knowledge of such an immoral action cause him over an extended period of time?
Clearly, future pangs of conscience are a rational consideration in
contemplating moral actions. There is also an indirect, internal consideration.
Participation in corrupt practices is likely to encourage corruption by others.
Rational persons will include the negative effects of living in a more corrupt
society on the happiness of themselves, their children and other loved ones in
their evaluations of overall self-interest. A number of external factors would
affect a decision on accepting a bribe. These would include the probability of
exposure, the degree of social condemnation which would result from exposure of
the action, and potential punishment by fines or jail if the action was illegal.
While acceptance of a bribe has been used as an example, the factors affecting
overall self-interest in that case would apply to a variety of moral decisions,
e.g., using public funds for personal purposes or disseminating false
accusations about a political opponent. We have argued that in a society which
has adopted an empirical approach to morality, most persons will act morally
most of the time. The discussion of overall self-interest above suggests a
number of moral positions an empirical society would adopt in order to persuade
even more of its members to act morally more of the time: (a) It would emphasize
an approach to education which results in children developing a conscience which
causes them happiness when they act morally. (b) It would promote as a societal
norm the condemnation of actions which violate the moral rules. (c) It would
allocate appropriate resources to increase the probability of detection of
immoral actions which affect the public welfare. (d) It would devise a system of
penalties which tries to achieve a balance between deterrence and
rehabilitation. 3. Applications In section 2 we gave premises and arguments for
the adoption of an empirical approach to morality. We concluded that moral rules
should be choices made by society (note 3) to promote happiness, and that these
choices will depend upon both innate factors and conditions in the society in
which the choices are made. While it is not the aim of this paper to determine
the content of the moral rules which would be chosen, we shall conclude by
illustrating how an empirical moralist would approach some contemporary social
problems. For this purpose we consider the issues of sexual relations, abortion,
and distributive justice. It is useful to divide a discussion of sexual
relations into premarital and postmarital phases. With exceptions for peculiar
circumstances, consensual sex is a pleasurable activity. Thus it is in the prima
facie self-interest of the persons involved. Is it in their overall
self-interest? How does such activity affect other members of the society? In a
society in which premarital sex is strongly condemned, the adverse effects of
discovery would lead some individuals to conclude that such activity was not in
their overall self-interest. This appears to have been a majority opinion in the
United States before World War II. In recent decades there has been both an
increase in premarital sex and a decrease in its moral condemnation suggesting
an interplay between such activity and society's attitude towards it. In the
absence of moral condemnation what is the long term effect of premarital sex on
happiness? Here our empirical knowledge is inadequate. Literature about the
Victorian period in England suggests that their negative attitude toward sex
caused considerable unhappiness. Current literature presents a mixed picture of
the results of sexual freedom on individual happiness. Other members of society
are affected when premarital sex leads to pregnancy. It is especially clear at
present that the quality of care which children receive has a major effect on
them and on their relations with other members of society. There is strong
evidence that children conceived in premarital relationships receive poorer care
on the average than those produced after marriage. Thus it is in the
self-interest of society to adopt policies to reduce the incidence of premarital
sex leading to childbirth. Two divergent approaches can be proposed. One
approach would attempt to strengthen the moral condemnation of premarital sex in
order to reduce its frequency and associated accidental pregnancies. The other
approach would concentrate on preventing accidental pregnancy by improving sex
education and access to contraceptives. The moral rule in a society taking the
latter approach would condemn the production of children who would not be well
cared for. After marriage, fidelity to one's spouse is an important moral issue.
The orthodox moral view in Western societies has always strongly condemned
adultery. However, the degree to which many members of a society have subscribed
to this view has varied in different societies at different times. The degree of
condemnation has also differed with gender. As in the case of premarital sex,
adulterous relations have flourished because they give intense short term
gratification. What are the long term consequences? The current evidence is that
infidelity is frequently discovered leading to adverse effects on overall
self-interest. Because it exposes a serious violation of marital trust,
discovery generally causes the betrayed partner severe unhappiness. The degree
of unhappiness may be sufficient to lead to divorce; even if it does not, there
are strong negative effects on the marriage relationship. When there are
children, they too are frequently adversely affected. What approaches could
society take to promote the overall self-interest of its members? One approach
is to attempt to strengthen the moral condemnation of extramarital sexual
relations with the aim of reducing the incidence of infidelity and the resulting
stresses on marriage. As a hypothetical alternative, a society might choose not
to condemn extramarital relations while urging marriage partners to consider the
long term effects of such activity. (As with premarital relations, accidental
pregnancies would continue to be condemned.) Could marriage stability be
separated from sexual fidelity, and would this be in the overall self-interest
of the members of such a society? Since that approach to sexual morality has not
been used, no empirical answer to these questions can be given. The historical
record shows that independent of a society's moral system unwanted pregnancies
occur. A rational society will adopt policies to minimize their number. The use
of abortion to terminate an unwanted pregnancy is the subject of intense moral
debate. The central arguments of the opposing views are well known. The
opponents of abortion cite the moral rule against killing innocent persons,
i.e., the right to life. Those who would permit abortion cite a woman's right to
choose. A consistent application of the right to life argument does not allow
exceptions for rape or incest, and applies as soon as an egg is fertilized. The
broadest application of the choice argument permits abortion up to the time of
birth. Neither argument satisfies most members of our society. When moral
condemnation has been unsuccessful in preventing an undesired pregnancy, how
would an advocate of empirical morality approach the issue of abortion? Such an
advocate would consider the effects of abortion on the self-interest of pregnant
women, their partners and members of society in general. One would first
determine whether there is evidence that most women who choose to have an
abortion to terminate an unwanted pregnancy find that their decision resulted in
an overall increase in happiness. If that is true (as it appears to be),
consideration should be given to the long term effects of abortion on the
woman's partner. The main issue of contention, however, is the morality of
terminating the life of an embryo or fetus. Although almost all human beings
agree that there is a basic moral prohibition against killing, they differ in
their approval of exceptions to this general rule. Killing of animals for food
is generally accepted, while killing animals for sport or for medical research
has some opponents. Killing human beings in time of war is generally accepted,
while the killing of human beings as a punishment is a current topic of vigorous
debate. Individuals have an obvious self-interest in living in a society which
agrees upon a basic prohibition against killing human beings. In those cases
where killing is accepted, an individual must believe that a special
consideration makes it in their overall self-interest to approve an exception to
the general prohibition. For the case of abortion this special consideration is
the increase in happiness resulting from the termination of an unwanted
pregnancy. A critical factor in balancing the happiness of those desiring an
abortion against the basic prohibition against killing (except for those holding
extreme opinions) is the time at which the abortion occurs.