The desire for an organization that would help the international community
“avoid future conflicts” and the recognized need for a global body that
would “promote international economic and social cooperation” led the
powerful states emerging from the rubble of WWII to develop the United Nations.
The newly formed United Nations “represented an expression of hope for the
possibilities of a new global security arrangement and for fostering the social
and economic conditions necessary for peace to prevail” (Mingst and Karns 2).
The need for mutual cooperation amongst the states following the second of the
global wars was vital to the reconstruction of war-torn Europe, and for the
development of a new world order. This attempt at cooperation was not the first
of its kind. According to Mingst and Karns, “The UN’s Charter built on
lessons learned from the failed League of Nations created at the end of World
War I and earlier experiments with international unions, conference diplomacy,
and dispute settlements mechanisms” (2). Despite this “experience” in
mutual cooperation, the founding states still faced many problems in the
security arena due to the advent of the Cold War. In order to effectively deal
with security issues facing the UN, the Security Council turned to “peace-
Mulligan 2 keeping” as an alternative to armed aggression. According to the
United Nations Department of Public Information, “Peacekeeping was pioneered
and developed by the United Nations as one of the means for maintaining
international peace and security” (1998), and the UN deals with particular
problems through “the prevention, containment, and moderation of hostilities
between or within states through the use of multinational forces of soldiers,
police, and civilians” (Mingst and Karns 3). This was a very different
approach to quelling conflicts that had never before been practiced.
Peacekeeping was “a creative response to the breakdown of great-power unity
and the spread of East-West tensions to regional conflicts” (Mingst and Karns
3). Before the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate, John
R. Bolton, Senior Vice President of the American Enterprise Institute, stated
further reasoning for the evolution of peacekeeping. He notes: ‘Traditional’
U.N. peacekeeping evolved when it became clear that the broad intentions of the
Framers of the U.N. Charter were rendered largely meaningless by the onset of
the Cold War. U.N. involvement in international crises, far from being the
central dispute-resolution mechanism envisioned by the Framers in Chapters VI
and VII, became episodic and incidental to the main global confrontation between
East and West. Since “Cold War tensions have subsided, peace has been
threatened by resurgent ethnic and nationalist conflicts in Mulligan 3 many
regions. As a result, U.N. peacekeeping operations have grown rapidly in number
and complexity in recent years. While 13 operations were established in the
first forty years of U.N. peacekeeping, 28 new operations have been launched
since 1988” (UNDPI 1998). The following map shows the many regions of the
world in which the United Nations has become involved in a peacekeeping mission:
Mulligan 4 Due in part because of the extraordinarily limited dimensions within
which U.N. peacekeeping was feasible, a clear set of principles evolved to
describe the elements necessary for successful U.N. operations. These rules
would become the standard from which future U.N. peace-keeping missions would be
drawn. The first criterion for a U.N. peacekeeping mission was consent.
According to Bolton, “All of the relevant parties to a dispute had to agree to
the participation of U.N. peacekeepers in monitoring, observing or policing a
truce, cease fire, or disengagement of combatants” (2000). This agreement must
not only grant the U.N. the right to intervene in the state’s internal
affairs, but also detail the “scope of its mission and the operational
requirements for carrying out that mission” (Bolton 2000). A nation-state, at
any time, could withdraw its consent at which point the U.N. forces would
withdraw. One example of revoking consent occurred in “May, 1967, when Egypt
insisted on the withdrawal of the U.N. Expeditionary Force (established after
the Suez Canal Crisis of 1956) from its territory along the border with
Israel” (Bolton 2000). U.N. forces were forced to leave, and as a result, the
Six Day War followed. Mulligan 5 A second requirement was the notion that the
U.N. forces would not take sides in the conflict. Bolton states that …U.N.
peacekeepers were [to be] neutral [amongst] the parties to the conflict, not
favoring one or another of them. It was understood to be elemental that the
United Nations could not ‘take sides’ in a conflict without itself becoming
involved in the very situation it was trying to stabilize or resolve (2000).
Remaining neutral, however, would prove to be difficult as we will witness
further along in this work. To ensure the U.N. forces neutrality, the
peacekeepers were “almost always only lightly armed, or unarmed, and they
frequently depended on the cooperation of the parties to a dispute for
logistical support or cooperation” (Bolton 2000). Lacking the appropriate
offensive capabilities would deter possible outbreaks of aggression on the part
of the peacekeeping forces. According to Mingst and Karns, “Peacekeepers use
military force only as a last resort and in self-defense. This precedent was a
response to the difficulties encountered in the Congo in 1961 when the Security
Council authorized the United Nations Operation in the Congo (UNOC) to use force
to prevent civil war and to remove foreign mercenaries in that country. The use
of force – even limited force – is fraught with political and legal
controversy” (79). As a result of the limited military Mulligan 6
capabilities, the U.N. peacekeepers “had no right of enforcement, and their
missions were deliberately non-coercive, not intended to compel any party to
accept a particular settlement. U.N. rules of engagement, through
long-established practice, provided for the use of force essentially only in
self-defense” (Bolton 2000). The use of force by a U.N. force would be
questioned in future peacekeeping endeavors. U.N. involvement in Somalia would
prove to be one such example of the problems experienced by the occupying
forces. Somalia has been described as the textbook example of a “collapsed”
or “failed” state. Throughout the period of intervention, those involved in
“restoring hope” – from the military and civilian sides – no doubt
understood too little about the sources of state dissolution and the respective
roles of the Somali clan system, colonialism, and Cold War geopolitics in the
horn of Africa. Prior to British and Italian colonialism, “there was no common
Somali identity or centralized control over the territory of what became
Somalia. Although more homogeneous than other countries in Africa – with a
common ethnicity, language, culture, and religion (Islam) – Somalia’s
geographical area was occupied by nomadic Mulligan 7 pastoral groups, organized
predominately by paternal kinship” (Weiss 71). The continually moving
population made establishing a centralized governmental body difficult and there
was no recognition of a “hierarchical system”. This lack of a controlling
body led to conflict among the indigenous peoples. Thomas G. Weiss states that
conflict was “common among lineages, especially in competition for land and
resources necessary for survival. But there were conflict resolution mechanisms
within the lineages, known as the ‘xeer,’ which prevented the escalation of
conflicts by inhibiting the excessive economic stratification in society”
(71+). He goes on to say that, “The spread of Islam modified conflict
management by adding a mild form of the Shari’ah Islamic Law. Acts of
vengeance were diminished through the concept of the ‘dia,’ or the payment
of ‘blood money’ compensation to the victim by the violator” (Weiss 72).
Despite the lack of a governing body to enforce laws, social institutions were
there to control behavior. While the basis of organization was direct lineage,
groups were also structured by subclans and then clan families, each
predominantly associated with sometimes overlapping geographical areas. The six
overarching major Mulligan 8 clan families are the Darod, Digil, Dir, Hawiye,
Issaq, and Rahanwein. Traditionally, lineages continually created and shifted
alliances among other groups and subclans. The end of colonialism in 1960
further shifted alliances amongst the clans. The transition from a lineage/clan
based society to a centralized state authority posed new problems for the
independent Somali government. However, governmental attempts to rid the
political environment of clan-influence failed when an army coup in 1969 placed
Mohammed Siad Barre in power. Thomas G. Weiss explains the result of Barre’s
rise to power. He says, Rhetorically, Barre’s policy of ‘scientific
socialism’ aimed to eliminate ‘clanism,’ but the end result of his
twenty-two-year rule was strengthening of clan-based politics. He forbade the
use of clan names; however, his primary method of obtaining and maintaining
power was to draw support from his own clan and those linked by lineage and to
pit other clans against one another. Virginia Lung has described this policy as
a form of ‘clan clientelism,’ in which arms, money, and land were
distributed to clans in order to maintain his power (73). Thus, the clan-based
system was not eliminated; it was reinforced. The late 1980’s saw the steady
decline in Barre’s power. “The combination of food crises, economic
collapse, and the end of Cold War competition in the horn, along with the
resulting decline in foreign aid, began to erode Barre’s base” (Weiss 75).
Further, the rise of clan-based national movements and their success in
challenging Barre’s Mulligan 9 rule led to the multiplication of clan based
factions. “Spurred by the fear that one group’s assumption of power would be
detrimental to another’s own position,” says Weiss, “clan-based opposition
led to extreme fragmentation of Somali society” (75). In the end, Barre’s
own policy backfired on him. By 1990, his power base was limited to only one
clan – the Marehan. In 1991 and 1992 “civil order in Somalia totally
collapsed as warring clans seized control of parts of the country” (Mingst and
Karns 92). The fighting that followed, with clans and subclans constituted in
loose alliances without central control, took place at a time of serious
drought. That combination proved disastrous for the population at large. By
1992, “almost 4.5 million people, more than half the total number in the
country, were threatened with starvation, severe malnutrition and related
diseases” (UNDPI 1997). According to Mingst and Karns, “Widespread famine
and chaos accompanied the fighting, forcing hundreds of thousands of civilians
to the brink of starvation. Control of food was a vital political resource for
the Somali warlords and a currency to pay the mercenary gangs who formed their
militias” (92). At this time, “most government, NGO, and U.N. humanitarian
Mulligan 10 organizations evacuated staff and suspended programs” (Weiss 78).
A handful of organizations, however, remained and attempted to counteract
overwhelming human suffering. In mid-1992, “in response to the increased media
coverage, the number Of NGOs dramatically increased temporarily, eventually
numbering around fifty” (Weiss 79). However, as Lt. General Manfred Eisele
illustrates in his report to the United Nations following the Somalia crisis it
was hard to make progress without military intervention. He says: The descent
into anarchy, with the concomitant lack of security, was the main reason why a
large-scale and well-coordinated relief operation could not be mounted in
Somalia in 1992. Although notable results were achieved on the humanitarian
relief front, including the advocacy work of NGOs, the mass feeding kitchens
operated by the International Committee of the Red Cross and the opening of
Mogadishu port the World Food Programme, far too little was achieved too late
and the lives of countless Somalis, mainly women and young children, were lost.
Thus, adequate security arrangements [were] imperative to safeguard the
humanitarian space needed for successful relief operations. At this point,
“international pressure [was] building for the secretary-general and the
Security Council to intervene in Somalia in an effort to end months of factional
fighting” (San Diego Union-Tribune 1992). However, some members appeared
reluctant to become deeply involved in what they saw as an increasingly
dangerous and chaotic situation. Further, there was also “widespread
reluctance among Security Council members to suggest any peacekeeping role for
the United Nations when the Somali factions were Mulligan 11 still fighting one
another and bands of armed irregulars roam the country” (San Diego
Union-Tribune 1992). However, in April 1992, the U.N. decided to intervene.
Established to monitor the cease-fire in Mogadishu, the capital of Somalia, and
to provide protection and security for United Nations personnel, equipment and
supplies at the seaports and airports in Mogadishu and escort deliveries of
humanitarian supplies from there to distribution centers in the city and its
immediate environs, the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) began. 500
Pakistani troops were deployed in August 1992. However, by November 1992,
“1,000 Somalis [were] dying every day and three-fourths of Somalia’s
children under age five [were] already dead” (Mingst and Karns 92). The
secretary-general of the U.N. felt that “more forceful measures” were
needed. In December 1992, the U.N. authorized “a large U.S.-led
military-humanitarian intervention – Unified Task Force (UNITAF) – to secure
ports and airfields, protect relief shipments and workers, and assist
humanitarian relief efforts” (Mingst and Karns 92+). Also on UNITAF’s agenda
were the imposition of a ceasefire, and the disarmament of the various factions.
In 1993, however, UNITAF was Mulligan 12 replaced by UNISOM II after few results
in peacekeeping were achieved. UNISOM II differed from previous attempts at
intervention in that it was authorized to use force when disarming the factions.
Similarly, the faction leaders were now targets for elimination by the
intervention forces. This converted the U.N.’s role from neutral peacekeeper
to active belligerent, putting UNISOM “in the worst of all possible worlds
which past peacekeepers had scrupulously avoided…[and] made it one of the
players in the conflict” (Mingst and Karns 93). As the U.S. military pursued a
more active role in thwarting the factions, they experienced casualties. On
October 3, 1994, 18 soldiers were killed and 78 wounded during a rescue attempt.
The American public was outraged by the massacre, and did not legitimize the
sacrifice made by the American soldiers nor the current role of its military
abroad. U.S. troops were withdrawn from Somalia in March 1995. When the last of
the U.N. troops were withdrawn, the ultimate result of the military help and
humanitarian delivery was unclear. It was a “non-event,” wrote Gerard
Prunier, and “life went on pretty much the same way as it had gone on during
the late UNISOM II period” (Weiss 95). Three years and some $4 billion had
Mulligan 13 left the warring parties better armed, rested, and posed to resume
civil war. The Somalia crisis can be analyzed by examining the relationship
between the IO, namely the U.N., and the nation-state, Somalia. As we have seen,
IO’s do not prevent wars from happening. They can not prevent them because
they do not have the power to do so. Only the nation-state can prevent the war.
In order to understand this better, we must look at this through the Westphalian
System v. Grotian Law perspective. The Westphalian system, based on the Treaty
of Westphalia of 1648, is one that contends that the nation-state has the right
to territorial self-determination. Essentially, the people within their
territory decide want they want, and no other nation can intervene in their
internal affairs. The Somali warlords believed that they had the right to
determine what was best for them within their country’s boundaries. Thus, they
rejected the U.N. presence in their homeland. Grotian Law, however, contends
that nation-states must work together in order to achieve common interests, and
that cooperation is paramount. The U.N. adopted this role when it felt it needed
to intercede on Somalia’s behalf in order to alleviate global concerns for the
suffering people in Mulligan 14 Somalia. This is when the two schools of thought
are unable to reach decisions, and problems arise. The IO does not have the
authority to force the nation-state to comply with global concerns. As we have
seen in Somalia, the U.N. forces were unable to make great progress in
establishing peace. Another pattern observed in the Somalia issue is Rhetoric v.
Actual Behavior. Many times, a nation-state will sign treaties and then perform
actions completely opposite of this. In this case, the Somali warlords signed
countless ceasefires with envoys to allow humanitarian relief efforts to gain
access to the needy people. However, the fighting never seemed to end despite
the promised calm. Somalia and U.N. Peacekeeping Forces: Who Has the Right?
Seann T. Mulligan April 25, 2000 Professor Sterling-Folker POLS 225 Works
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Anthropology Today 8 (6). Works Cited Bolton, John R., Congressional Testimony,
April 4, 2000. Eisele, Lt. Gen. Manfred. Department of Peacekeeping Operations.
http://www.un.org Mingst, Karen A. and Margaret P. Karns. The United Nation in
the Post-Cold War Era, 2nd ed. Westview Press, 2000. San Diego Union-Tribune,
The. “Somalia civil war will test the mettle of new boss at U.N.” December
12, 1992. UN Department of Public Information. “UN Peacekeeping: Some
Questions and Answers”, September 1996. UN Department of Public Information.
“Somalia – UNISOM I”, March 1997. UN Department of Public Information.
“Somalia – UNISOM II”, August 1996. Weiss, Thomas G., Military-Civilian
Actions. Rowman and Littlefield, 1999. UN Peacekeeping in Somalia Widespread
drought in Somalia brought relief efforts into the country. Starvation and
disease are rampant. The collapse of the political framework led to civil war
amongst the various factions. The relief efforts were being targeted by the
Somali warlords and the Somali president petitions the U.N. for help. U.N.
peacekeeping forces are sent in to protect humanitarian relief workers and to
ensure that the food stuffs are being delivered. Three Phases: I. UNISOM I
(United Nations Operations in Somalia) -- comprised mainly of 500 Pakistani
soldiers, lightly armed II. UNITAF (United Task Force) -- after little is gained
by UNISOM I, the U.N. secretary-general calls for more coercive action. -- a
large U.S.-led military-humanitarian intervention, known as “Operation Restore
Hope” -- UNITAF was largely successful in achieving its humanitarian
objectives, supplying food to those who need it and imposing de facto ceasefire
in areas of deployment -- could not, however, fulfill the larger tasks of
peacemaking. The US withdraws from Somalia and was replaced by UNISOM II III.
UNISOM II -- a larger and more heavily armed force than a traditional
peacekeeping contingent but smaller than UNITAF and lacking much of the heavy
equipment and airpower brought by the US. Result: UN forces have succeeded in
relieving much of the starvation but not in helping the Somalis to reestablish a
national government or to end their internal strife. Relevant Approaches for
Analysis: 1. Westphalian System v. Grotian Law 2. Rhetoric v. Actual Behavior